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Abstract – Certain research strands can yield “forbidden knowledge”. This term refers to knowledge that is 
considered too sensitive, dangerous or taboo to be produced or shared. Discourses about such publication 
restrictions are already entrenched in scientific fields like IT security, synthetic biology or nuclear physics 
research. This paper makes the case for transferring this discourse to machine learning research. Some 
machine learning applications can very easily be misused and unfold harmful consequences, for instance 
with regard to generative video or text synthesis, personality analysis, behavior manipulation, software 
vulnerability detection and the like. Up to now, the machine learning research community embraces the idea 
of open access. However, this is opposed to precautionary efforts to prevent the malicious use of machine 
learning applications. Information about or from such applications may, if improperly disclosed, cause harm 
to people, organizations or whole societies. Hence, the goal of this work is to outline norms that can help to 
decide whether and when the dissemination of such information should be prevented. It proposes review 
parameters for the machine learning community to establish an ethical framework on how to deal with 
forbidden knowledge and dual-use applications. 
Keywords – forbidden knowledge, machine learning, artificial intelligence, governance, dual-use, 
publication norms 
1 Introduction 
Currently, machine learning research is, not much different from other scientific fields, embracing the idea 
of open access. Research findings are publicly available and can be widely shared amongst other researchers 
and foster idea flow and collaboration. Amongst the description of research findings, scientists frequently 
share details about their own machine learning models or even the complete source code via platforms like 
GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge and others. However, the tenet of providing open access contradicts 
precautionary efforts to prevent the malicious use of machine learning applications. Some applications can 
very easily be used for harmful purposes, for instance with regard to generative video or text synthesis, 
personality analysis or software vulnerability detection. Concrete examples for high-stakes machine learning 
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research are OpenAI’s GPT-2 text generator (Radford et al. 2019b), Michal Kosinski’s and Yilun Wang’s 
software for detecting people’s sexual orientation based on facial images (Kosinski and Wang 2018), 
developments in the field of synthetic media (Chesney and Citron 2018) and many more. 
Therefore, researchers have to answer the question whether “AI development [should] be fully open-
sourced, or are there ethical reasons to limit its accessibility?” (Murgia 2019) Scientists demand for a “more 
nuanced discussions of model and code release decisions in the AI community” (Radford et al. 2019a), ask 
“whether sometimes it is appropriate to withhold open publication of some aspects of [the] research” 
(Ovadya and Whittlestone 2019, p. 2) and perceive “publication challenges inherent to some parts of AI 
research” (Clark et al. 2019). Further, machine learning practitioners call for more research on the “efficacy 
of policies for restricting release of AI technologies” (King et al. 2019, p. 26) and see an “urgent need to 
develop principled decision-making frameworks” (Solaiman et al. 2019a, p. 15) with regard to publication 
norms. If machine learning research can possess, as Michal Kosinski admits, “considerable negative 
implications”, which could “pose a threat to an individual’s well-being, freedom, or even life” (Kosinski et al. 
2013), the decisive question is: Is it worth publishing those research results? Are the reputation gains a 
researcher achieves by publishing intriguing research insights or the fact that new insights can usher 
scientific progress worth the risk of others weaponizing those insights? This paper is supposed to be a 
response to those questions, demands and challenges. Information about or from maliciously used machine 
learning applications may, if improperly disclosed, cause harm to people or organizations. In this context, 
harm stands for negative outcomes like fatal or nonfatal casualties, physical and psychological suffering, as 
well as social, political or economic disruption or damage. The goal of this paper is to outline norms that can 
help to decide whether and when the dissemination of such information should be prevented. 
Without a doubt, research on machine learning has an immense impact on societies. Roughly speaking, the 
downsides of recent innovations range from threats to democracy and public discourse to massive violations 
of privacy rights to autonomous weapon systems and algorithmic discrimination (Knight and Hao 2019). 
This is why perceiving machine learning research solely from the perspective of technological and societal 
progress is not enough. In fact, machine learning research can have devastating consequences on a grand 
scale. Of course, the emergence of negative effects of new technologies can rarely be attributed to a single 
scientific paper. Nevertheless, at regular intervals research findings are published, which can be anticipated 
with great certainty to be directly abused and to cause damage. Hence, the aim of this paper is to define some 
initial criteria that can help decide whether research results in the field of artificial intelligence or machine 
learning should be publicly shared or kept secret or at least under control to a certain extent. 
In case of the latter, I want to use the term “forbidden knowledge”, which refers to knowledge that is 
considered too sensitive, dangerous or taboo to be produced or shared (Kempner et al. 2011; Dürrenmatt 
1980). Forbidden knowledge is akin to what Nick Bostrom calls an “information hazard”, which he defined 
as “a risk that arises from the dissemination or the potential dissemination of (true) information that may 
cause harm or enable some agents to cause harm.” (Bostrom 2011, p. 2). The term “forbidden knowledge” is 
used not just to descriptively refer to negative or non-knowledge, but to normative limits of what should be 
(publicly) known and not known. In this context, it must be considered that forbidden knowledge is a 
dynamic concept. One cannot determine universally and independently from a certain ethical standpoint, 
point in time or culture which knowledge should be forbidden. Nevertheless, this paper is intended to assume 
that, in the light of current political and cultural climates, specific risks are associated with the disclosure of 
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certain research findings in the field of machine learning and that those risks need to be minimized. Hence, 
it is the social environment that shapes the decision not to make certain knowledge publicly available, not 
the knowledge itself or certain static categories. 
In the first part, this paper outlines the theory of forbidden knowledge in the context of machine learning 
applications (chapter 3). In the second part, it describes how the emergence, availability and use of forbidden 
knowledge can be monitored (chapter 4). Various areas in which forbidden knowledge occurs are analyzed. 
In the last part, methods to control or govern forbidden knowledge are conceptualized, ranging from 
information sharing rules to pre-publication risk assessments or technical restrictions (chapter 5). The 
overarching goal of the paper is to propose review parameters for the machine learning community to 
establish an ethical framework on how to deal with forbidden knowledge. 
2 Method 
Since not much can be known about what is not known publicly, theoretical as well as empirical research on 
forbidden knowledge is quite difficult. Nevertheless, something can be said about the theory of forbidden 
knowledge, how to monitor it, in which areas it is produced and how it may be governed. In order to do so, 
the article is underpinned by a literature analysis. Using search engines like Google Scholar, Web of Science, 
Scopus, PhilPapers, arXiv and SSRN helped to identify the relevant literature on forbidden knowledge, 
governance of dual-use technologies – which is especially prevalent in the field of the biology and computer 
security community – and machine learning risks. Since the literature, especially about forbidden knowledge, 
is quite broad and heterogeneous, the term “forbidden knowledge” has to be defined, which shall be done in 
the following chapter. Not only scientific literature was consulted in order to find tangible instances of 
forbidden knowledge in machine learning. Since many applications are discussed in news articles and not in 
scientific papers, news articles were gathered via Google News as well. 
3 Theory of forbidden knowledge 
3.1 Types of forbidden knowledge 
Forbidden knowledge originates in Christianity’s idea of Eve eating an apple from the forbidden tree of 
knowledge (Johnson 1996). Today, the term stands for scientific knowledge that is too dangerous to inquire 
or to be disseminated unrestrictedly, since knowledge equates power, which can be abused. Hitherto, 
forbidden knowledge was mostly relevant in disciplines such as IT-security, armaments research and a few 
other research fields (Tucker 2012a; Freitas 2006). Especially in the field of nuclear physics research, 
scientific knowledge can become a “mixed blessing”, since it “makes the destruction of human life possible” 
(Smith 1978, p. 34). Moreover, this also applies to other fields like synthetic biology, where for instance a 
paper described the synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al. 2002), leading to concerns about bioterrorism. Those 
cases lead to demands that journal editors may “conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs 
the potential societal benefits” (Atlas et al. 2003, p. 1149) and consequently do not publish specific papers at 
all or only in a modified version (Selgelid 2007). 
One can distinguish different types of forbidden knowledge. Knowledge can be forbidden because of the 
“nature” of the knowledge in question – this is mostly relevant in a religious context –, because of the methods 
necessary to gain the knowledge – for instance via unethical human experiments – or because of the 
consequences, which the public availability of the knowledge would have. In the context of this paper, only 
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the latter type of forbidden knowledge shall be considered. In order to narrow down the term even further, 
only that kind of forbidden knowledge will be discussed for which machine learning techniques are required 
as an essential factor. Here, only those techniques that are currently available and feasible, omitting to 
speculate about potential future applications, will be taken into consideration. Furthermore, forbidden 
knowledge does not only refer to knowledge that is the output of particular machine learning applications – 
for example classifications about intimate traits of individuals. It also refers to the knowledge about 
techniques or methods, which are the foundations to build machine learning applications that can be misused 
– for instance methods to build powerful generators for synthetic media. 
3.2 Intentions 
The concept of forbidden knowledge is closely associated with the theory of dual-use technologies. 
Concerning the dual-use character of many machine learning applications, one has to distinguish between 
machine learning scientists who initially undertake the research leading to those applications and users who 
just utilize them. In this context, the intentions of scientists, which influence the design of the applications, 
can deviate from the intentions of the users, who can use the applications for purposes other than those for 
which they were designed. A common scenario in this context would be that researchers pursue good 
intentions, whereas users have, in many cases, malevolent goals. However, it would be too easy to simply 
differentiate between good and bad intentions, where the former proceed with dual-use technologies or 
forbidden knowledge, respectively, in a responsible manner and the latter not. Intentions become bad when 
they are viewed from the perspective of a certain ethical theory. And even if intentions are identified as bad, 
this does not mean that the ones possessing them are immoral people. 
In this sense, bad intentions are virtually almost the product of certain social situations or systems (Zimbardo 
2007). That being said, particular social situations or systems can give rise to intentions to (mis-)use 
forbidden knowledge to cause harm as well as to motives to prevent forbidden knowledge to come into 
existence in the first place or to be disseminated in a way that could threaten other individuals or societies. 
On the one hand, one must assume that there will always be groups of people who seek to enclose forbidden 
knowledge and prevent scenarios of harm. On the other hand, one must at the same time assume, and this is 
a fundamental premise of the paper, that there will always be groups of people at private companies, 
government agencies, research institutes or universities as well as non-institutional entities or private 
persons who have clearly malign motives and who will try to exploit all that is technically possible in order 
to pursue their interests. This constant of the existence of malign intentions has to guide the considerations 
about the responsible handling of forbidden knowledge. 
4 Monitoring forbidden knowledge 
Monitoring the emergence of forbidden knowledge is a prerequisite for the successful governance of it. This 
means studying emerging machine learning technologies in different areas and sectors and identifying the 
dual-use characteristics of potentially harmful applications. Following pre-existing decision frameworks for 
dual-use technologies in other areas (Tucker 2012c; Miller 2018), one can differentiate between the 
magnitude of potential harms resulting from forbidden knowledge, the imminence of potential harms, the 
ease of access to forbidden knowledge, the amount of skills needed to gain forbidden knowledge and the 
awareness about the emergence or malicious use of forbidden knowledge (see Table 1). Besides this 
categorization of forbidden knowledge in machine learning research, further questions to assess potential 
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publication risks can be asked, i.e. whether harms have the form of structural risks or direct consequences 
for individuals, other living entities, the environment or non-living things, what type of harm is imminent, 
i.e. whether it is aiming at physical or mental health, economic stability, human rights, the environment etc., 
how high the likelihood of the occurring of a particular harm is, whether it is ephemeral or permanent, what 
possibilities of responding to a specific harm exist, whether the source of harm is traceable and whether 
potential harms can be redressed (Crootof 2019). 
 low high 
magnitude of harm single individuals are affected whole societies are affected 
 minor detriments, harms or 
affliction 
major detriments or casualties 
 low monetary costs associated 
with incidents 
high monetary costs associated 
with incidents 
imminence of potential 
harms 
individuals or organizations can 
gain and use forbidden knowledge 
in the remote future 
individuals or organizations 
already possess forbidden 
knowledge or can gain and use it 
in the near future 
ease of access to forbidden 
knowledge 
existence of particular kinds of 
forbidden knowledge is known 
knowledge is classified and under 
control of specialized authorities 
or closed organizations 
 technological requirements or 
knowledge itself are commercially 
available 
hardware, software and data sets 
are difficult to obtain 
amount of skills needed to 
gain forbidden knowledge 
individuals with low experience 
or expertise levels can gain 
forbidden knowledge 
only highly skilled individuals can 
gain forbidden knowledge 
 ready-made software bundles or 
how-to manuals exist 
advanced persistent threats exist 
awareness about the 
emergence or malicious use 
of forbidden knowledge 
emergence or malicious use of 
forbidden knowledge was 
unforeseen but foreseeable or 
completely unforeseen 
emergence or malicious use of 
forbidden knowledge is easily 
discernable 
Table 1 - Assessment of forbidden knowledge 
4.1 Availability 
The decisive question is: how difficult is it for individuals with malicious intentions to weaponize a machine 
learning application in practice? They need to be aware of certain technological features, the necessary skills 
as well as the necessary resources. The last two aspects depend on the availability of ready-made products 
or platforms. The more difficult it is to reproduce a certain technical capability in light of the available papers, 
codes, models, data sets, hardware etc., the more talent, skill or resources are necessary to utilize the 
capability. But since talent as well as advanced skills are scarce, the likelihood of abuse scenarios drops. 
Although, in fact, the opposite trend prevails: the likelihood of abuse scenarios increases. While many 
institutions like OpenAI, Facebook, Microsoft or others do not publish the full-size model of hazardous 
applications in the first place, freely accessible Internet platforms are emerging elsewhere, providing, in a 
simplified way, exactly those services that should be kept away from the public. 
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With "Grover", the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence offers a platform where fake news can be created 
on any given topic (Zellers et al. 2019). The same holds true for a platform from Adam King, which can be 
accessed via www.talktotransformer.com, or for the language model HAIM of the AI startup AI21 Labs, which 
can be accessed and used via www.ai21.com/haim. The organization Lyrebird offers the possibility to create 
a voice recording from any given text (for security reasons up to now only with one's own voice) on its 
website. Furthermore, and given the case that the software becomes freely purchasable, everyone can edit 
audio files or fake voices, provided that only a few minutes of voice recordings are available as training data, 
using Adobe’s program “VoCo”. On thispersondoesnotexist.com, a software from Nvidia creates deceptively 
real facial images of people who do not exist. Furthermore, with the application "FakeApp" anyone can create 
DeepFakes. 
Hence, it seems obvious that technologies that can be instrumentalized for modern disinformation 
campaigns are becoming more widely available. It is to be expected that a process of “deskilling”, meaning a 
gradual decline in the amount of needed knowledge or the rise of ready-made software bundles or how-to 
manuals, affects the use of machine learning methods and applications, with the result that the number of 
individuals who can use potentially harmful machine learning technologies grows constantly. This process 
of “deskilling” is combined with a “democratization” of machine learning and its requirements like training 
data sets or software libraries. Open access and open source give rise to many innovations while rendering 
tools freely available to bigger and bigger crowds. At the same time the number of (non-expert, amateur) 
individuals with potentially malign intentions and willing to reinterpret the purpose of dual-use technologies 
in a harmful context grows. 
Possibly, the mere idea of using or processing data with methods of machine learning in a certain way poses 
the threat that individuals with malicious intentions realize this particular idea themselves. This is what Nick 
Bostrom (2011) calls “idea hazard”. The “idea hazard” is accompanied by the “data” or “product hazard” 
(Ovadya and Whittlestone 2019), where machine learning applications themselves or their respective 
outputs pose a danger. All the mentioned hazards can be conveyed by openly accessible research papers, 
containing more or less details about particular software solutions. Open access, however, is not a “binary 
variable” (Brundage et al. 2018, p. 87). There are gradations in the way research results can be shared, for 
instance by adopting a staged publication release during which various (negative) effects of the released 
applications are monitored. Tangible information sharing rules relate to the kind of information or code that 
is exchanged or selectively made public. Documents about applications possessing certain risks of causing 
harm when used “in the wild” in an uncontrolled manner can contain rough descriptions of the achievement 
or simple proofs of concept. A next step is to publish pseudocode, parts of the code or machine learning 
algorithms without the necessary hyperparameters. Ultimately, papers can contain appendices with fully 
working exploits or the complete code together with the trained model as well as tutorials (see Table 2). 
Each level of sharing information raises the risk that third parties can use the research for malicious or 
criminal purposes. The fewer details that are shared by researchers, the higher the need for technical 
expertise on the part of third parties who wish to reproduce or harness the original achievements. Apart 
from the extend of shared technical details, the availability or reproducibility of forbidden knowledge 
depends on many further conditions: the amount of monetary costs to acquire certain hard- or software, 
whether code is equipped with or without comments as well as their level of detail, whether code is compiled 
or raw, whether details about the types of the required hardware being used are known and so forth. 
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availability low       high 
levels mere 
idea or 
concept 
concept 
paper 
pseudo 
code 
detailed 
paper 
training 
data 
trained 
models 
source 
code 
ready-
made 
product 
further 
dimensions 
amount of monetary costs to acquire particular sets of hard- or software / code equipped 
with or without comments / code equipped with or without hyperparameters / code is 
compiled or raw / details about the types of hardware being used 
Table 2 - Grades of availability 
4.2 Areas of forbidden knowledge 
In the following section, the paper sheds light on different areas of forbidden knowledge. Examples of 
machine learning based applications that were retracted or never got published are to be described. Various 
fields of application will be discussed, including contexts like sexuality, social manipulation, algorithmic 
discrimination, artificial general intelligence as well as further areas where sensitive information can be 
produced or acquired. 
Regardless of the particular area, one can differentiate between machine learning applications that aim at 
single individuals (e.g. “gaydar” applications) and applications that aim at a wider social context or whole 
societies (e.g. artificial general intelligence). Furthermore, one has to distinguish between single inventions 
or individual research works that result in forbidden knowledge (e.g. research on automatically winning 
commercial games) and the dynamics of many small inventions or consecutive research activities that 
gradually produce forbidden knowledge (e.g. research on deep fakes). Moreover, applications that gather or 
detect sensitive information (e.g. digital suicide risk detectors) have to be differentiated from applications 
that generate or make up fake sensitive or discrediting information (e.g. text generators). In addition to that, 
either information on machine learning applications itself or information in the form of an application’s 
output can be considered to have the status of forbidden knowledge. 
4.2.1 Synthetic media 
Research on synthetic media and the publication of corresponding findings and insights is delicate. This was 
perfectly shown by researchers at OpenAI. They developed a text generator called GPT-2 (Radford et al. 
2019b) which is so powerful that they decided to follow a staged release policy, meaning that they released 
a small model with 124 million parameters in February 2019, a model with 355 million parameters in May 
2019, a model with 774 million parameters in August 2019 and the full model in November 2019 (Radford 
et al. 2019a; Clark et al. 2019; Solaiman et al. 2019b). OpenAI has teamed up with several partner universities 
studying the human susceptibility to artificially generated texts, potential misuse scenarios or biases in the 
produced texts. The original decision not to release the full-fledged text generator was fueled by fears 
concerning the circumstance that GPT-2 could significantly lower the costs of disinformation campaigns or 
simplify the creation of spambots for forums or social media platforms. Although admitting that they found 
“minimal evidence of misuse” via their “threat monitoring” (Solaiman et al. 2019a), doubts are justified as to 
whether their monitoring, which was mainly focused on online communities, was really reliable, since 
OpenAI and their partners can mostly monitor current public plans or cases of misuse for their application, 
but not non-public or potential future misuse scenarios as well as advanced persistent threats. 
In the overall view, machine learning technologies make it possible to automatically create any media, be it 
images (Karras et al. 2017), videos (Thies et al. 2016), audio recordings (Bendel 2017) or texts (Radford et 
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al. 2019a). The quality of the media created is constantly improving, so that previously accepted principles 
such as “seeing is believing” or “hearing is believing” have to be abandoned. Whether the content 
corresponds with actual events does not matter. While researchers try to catch up and find solutions to 
reliably detect fake samples produced by generative adversarial networks (Valle et al. 2018; Rössler et al. 
2019), it remains true that generative models make it really easy to generate or edit media. Despite those 
technical solutions to detect synthetic media and approaches to educate humans on detecting machine 
manipulated media (Groh et al. 2019), a further, quite strict idea is to limit the availability of trained 
generative models. Against this background it is astounding how unquestioningly papers have been 
published in recent years, in which leap innovations in the generation of fake media, especially videos, are 
described – although many research groups, for instance the one behind Face2Face, did not release their 
code (Thies et al. 2015; Thies et al. 2016; Thies et al. 2018; Fried et al. 2019; Ovadya and Whittlestone 2019; 
Thies et al. 2019). Synthetic videos, no matter if they are generated through Face2Face, DeepFakes, FaceSwap 
or NeuralTextures, can have all sorts of negative consequences, from harm to individuals, national security, 
to the economy and democracy (Chesney and Citron 2018). Fake porn is used to intimidate journalists, fake 
audios to mimic CEOs and commit fraud, fake pictures to trick other people into disclosing sensitive 
information (Harwell 2018; Satter 2019) and so on. Despite obvious risks, the improvement of synthetic 
media also poses the risk of people claiming that real footage is fake, erroneously denying its verisimilitude. 
In this context, technical solutions to detect synthetic media should also operate in the opposite direction, 
meaning that they should be able to detect recordings that are real. 
4.2.2 Social manipulation 
Issues of social manipulation via machine learning applications came especially into public awareness after 
reports about the role of Cambridge Analytica during the successful UK’s Vote Leave campaign and the 2016 
US presidential election. Some of the methods used during the elections trace back to research in the field of 
psychometrics. Here lies the origin of methods where individual’s psychological profiles are automatically 
extracted from their (harmless) digital footprints via machine learning in order to influence their behavior 
or attitudes. Researchers proved that very few data points a particular individual generates suffice to make 
accurate predictions about personality traits (Youyou et al. 2015; Kosinski et al. 2015; Lambiotte and 
Kosinski 2014; Kosinski et al. 2014), which can in turn be used for improved persuasion techniques, called 
“micro targeting”. Micro targeting, for instance, can significantly raise the click-through-rates of personalized 
online advertisements (Matz et al. 2017). However, it is not just advertisements. Several companies exploit 
techniques where psychometrics and machine learning are combined in order to conduce “behavioral change 
programs”, blurring the lines between the military and civic use of (dis-)information campaigns or “psy-ops” 
(Ramsay 2018). The scientists involved in the related research honestly talk about “considerable negative 
implications” (Kosinski et al. 2013) of their work. Psychometrics research, which builds the foundation for 
methods of social manipulation, was metaphorically called a “bomb” (Grassegger and Krogerus 2016). Others 
dubbed the methods used by Cambridge Analytica and similar organizations “weapons-grade 
communication techniques” (Cadwalladr 2019), which clearly points at the dangers certain machine learning 
applications can pose. If the scientists, whose research builds the foundation for micro targeting and other 
methods of machine learning based social manipulation, had not made their work publicly accessible or not 
carried it out in the first place, they would have been deprived of a great deal of reputation. At the same time, 
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however, it can be assumed that numerous negative effects could not have taken place, for example with 
regard to election rigging. 
4.2.3 Discrimination 
The emergence of (unintended) algorithmic discrimination can be a reason for retracting machine learning 
applications. To name just two examples: in 2016, Microsoft developed a chat bot called “Tay”. It was released 
on Twitter, so that users could have a conversation with it. After a while, it was bombarded with racist, sexist 
language by trolls. And since “Tay” is based on machine learning algorithms, it inherited and automatically 
reproduced the discriminatory language (Misty 2016). After one day, Microsoft had to retract the application. 
This example shows the danger of not anticipating that machine learning applications can be manipulated 
by adversarial inputs or not anticipating to equip those applications with meta rules, meaning that 
programmers define boundaries, software agents are not allowed to overstep (Wallach and Allen 2009). 
Another example where failures to prevent discrimination were an issue and lead to the retraction of 
machine learning based tools is Amazon’s experimental hiring software. The software used machine learning 
techniques to score job candidates (Dastin 2018). It discriminated against women, since it was trained with 
patterns in applications that were submitted over a 10-year period, which came mostly from men. Amazon 
had to shut down the project after they found out about its shortcomings. 
Those two examples, to which many more could be added (Bolukbasi et al. 2016), depict cases of 
discrimination through technology. Another strand of discrimination occurs when technology is used to 
assist discrimination. One can for instance think of using machine learning methods to sift through data sets 
containing demographics, profiling, biometric, medical or other behavioral data in order to gain insights 
about racial, sexual or cognitive differences between different groups of persons. It must be stressed that in 
this context, research on the nature versus nurture debate can be very problematic not only due to 
potentially malicious interest of the involved researchers, but also due to the inability of the public to deal 
with corresponding research findings and due to the political consequences the publication of particular 
findings would likely have. The same holds true with regard to machine learning based research on mental 
illnesses or intelligence. For instance, researchers showed that social media profiles or especially Facebook 
posts can be used to predict depression (Choudhury et al. 2013; Eichstaedt et al. 2018). Those insights can 
be used for the common good, but also for purposes of unjust social sorting or discrimination (Lyon 2003). 
4.2.4 Sexuality 
Issues related to sexuality are another area where machine learning applications can cause widespread 
harm. For instance, a software called “DeepNude” found rapid sales, allowing users to automatically render 
pictures (of women) into nude photos. Shortly after its release, the developers stopped offering the software 
(Quach 2019), but one can still use it via various online platforms. Deciding to stop selling the software did 
obviously not stop its further dissemination. Another case, where a particular machine learning application 
is more than just prone to abuse, is the use of deep neural networks for detecting sexual orientation from 
facial images. This was first demonstrated in the famous paper by Michal Kosinski and Yilun Wang (2018). 
The study raised a lot of criticism (Todorov 2018), but its findings were later confirmed by a replication study 
(Leuner 2019). John Leuner, who conducted the replication study, claimed that the research “may have 
serious implications for the privacy and safety of gay men and women” (Leuner 2019, iii), a sentence which 
is nearly identical with the claim of Kosinski and Wang, who write that their findings “expose a threat to the 
privacy and safety of gay men and women.” (Kosinski and Wang 2018) To prevent this threat to a certain 
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degree, Leuner did not disclose the source of his data, which he collected for his study. Otherwise, Kosinski 
and Wang stress that abandoning the publication of their findings “could deprive individuals of the chance 
to take preventive measures and policymakers the ability to introduce legislation to protect people.” 
(Kosinski and Wang 2018) The researchers hope that upcoming or current post-privacy societies are 
“inhabited by well-educated, tolerant people who are dedicated to equal rights” (Kosinski and Wang 2018). 
This may sound naïve, especially in view of current political trends and raising group-focused enmity. 
Therefore, the misuse of the aforementioned research is a considerable concern, advising stronger caution 
when publishing research results in the context of machine learning applications dedicated to reveal or 
generate traits connected to sexuality or sexual orientation. 
4.2.5 Further sensitive fields 
What holds true for sexuality is at the same time applicable to further sensitive fields where machine learning 
techniques are applied to detect forbidden knowledge about an individual’s intelligence, political views, 
ethnic origin, wealth, propensity to criminality, religiosity, drug use or mental illnesses. Regarding the latter, 
Facebook, for instance, repeatedly ushered initiatives for suicide and self-harm prevention. By merely 
analyzing likes, comments or other interactions on their platform, Facebook can “sense” suicide plans and 
help affected persons or persons who are related to the affected ones via overlays with information on 
suicide prevention. Due to its sensitive nature, this tool was not released in Europe and is therefore 
representing another case of forbidden knowledge (Keller 2018). Information for instance about one’s 
suicide risk are traditionally protected by privacy norms (Veghes et al. 2012, p. 705). Those norms were first 
and foremost based on restricting access to or controlling the dissemination of personal information, for 
example via concepts of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2010; Tavani 2008). With regard to existing 
machine learning techniques, those methods are obsolete (Belliger and Krieger 2018; Hagendorff 2019a). 
Now, intimate personal information like sentiments or personality traits can not only be automatically 
extracted from Social Media profiles (Youyou et al. 2015), but also from personal websites or blogs (Marcus 
et al. 2006; Yarkoni 2010), pictures (Segalin et al. 2017), smartphone usage (Cao et al. 2017; LiKamWa et al. 
2013) and many more. Furthermore, particularly sensitive applications for purposes of reading one’s mind, 
for rudimentary brain-to-brain interfaces or even the decoding of dreams are being developed (Jiang et al. 
2019; Horikawa and Kamitani 2017). This new, machine learning based research stands in a long tradition 
of trying to control, read or manipulate individual’s minds with different technologies (Wheelis 2012). 
Apart from machine learning technologies which aim at single individuals, there are applications that have 
effects on a more general, societal level. Examples for such applications, that can likewise fall under the 
category of forbidden knowledge, could be innovative artificial trading agents used for market manipulation 
(Wellman and Rajan 2017), software to conduct automated spear phishing (Seymour and Tully 2016), “AI 0-
days” or other massive vulnerabilities in machine learning procedures itself, as well as methods for 
automated software vulnerability detection (Brundage et al. 2018), classified surveillance technologies, the 
combination of data from fleets of earth-observing satellites with news sources, mobile devices, social media 
platforms and environment sensors (Kova 2019) or even autonomous applications build to assist with or 
conduct torture (McAllister 2017). In addition to such rather obvious areas where forbidden knowledge may 
occur, machine learning applications have also been held back in less obvious places as a result of risk 
assessments. For instance, a 2019 publication (Brown and Sandholm 2019) demonstrated how “Pluribus”, 
an AI based software, is stronger than professional human players in six-player no-limit Texas hold’em poker. 
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With a short reference to the fact that the “risk associated with releasing the code outweighs the benefits” 
(Brown and Sandholm 2019, p. 7), the researchers decided to only release the pseudocode, but not the 
complete program in order to not harm the poker community, as well as online poker companies. Ultimately, 
not only in poker, but in any online game where players can win money, it is to be expected that AI 
applications can be used to win money illegitimately using autonomous agents. The fact that software 
developers decide not to publish programs in this context is just another symptom of an increasing amount 
of forbidden knowledge in machine learning. 
Moreover, the creation of artificial general intelligence is associated with the fear of technology developing 
an uncontrollable momentum of its own (Bostrom 2014; Omohundro 2014, 2008; Tegmark 2017). That is 
why some researchers demand to halt every research effort aiming for artificial general intelligence – despite 
the fact that discussions around artificial general intelligence are often quite far-fetched and speculative. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that current technologies are completely rid of the risk of becoming 
uncontrollable. When Facebook, for instance, developed an artificially intelligent bot for negotiation 
purposes (Lewis et al. 2017), it happened that the negotiation software transitioned from using English 
language to a language or dialect of its own – which humans cannot understand. This phenomenon of 
autonomous agents developing code words for themselves (Mordatch and Abbeel 2017; Das et al. 2017; 
Lazaridou et al. 2016) prompted the Facebook researchers to shut down the negotiation bot (Wilson 2017) 
in order to stay in control about what the system is communicating. 
5 Governing forbidden knowledge 
In stable societies, most tools or technologies that are inclined or designed to harm other people are subject 
to a certain degree of control. This is most obvious in gun control, but also in areas like biological or chemical 
weapon conventions. In this context, material goods are affected. However, through machine learning and 
the related possibilities of harming other individuals or organizations, societies are increasingly entering a 
situation where similar regulatory measures for certain software or kinds of information need to be 
considered. This can be explained in particular by the fact that digital goods are easily scalable, which is not 
the case for material goods. This scalability, together with the observation that the global networking of 
technical artefacts generates a general loss of control over the distribution of digital goods, makes the new 
situation an immense technical as well as societal challenge. Information can be multiplied with virtually 
zero marginal costs and it can be transmitted without any or very few traces. Hence, export controls, 
reporting requirements as well as other mandatory regulations are very difficult to enforce. In fact, research 
on information control consistently states that “ontological friction”, meaning the forces that oppose the flow 
and dissemination of information, is constantly decreasing (Floridi 2005, 2006; Hagendorff 2017, 2018, 
2019b). Against the backdrop of digitization, the efforts required to generate, obtain, process and transmit 
information are becoming less and less, with the result that societies are “informationally porous” (Floridi 
2010, p. 7). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, a number of measures can be considered to control forbidden 
knowledge (see Table 5). Those measures or methods can comprise soft or hard laws. On the one hand, soft 
laws are generally accepted, voluntary norms about restrictive information sharing principles without 
rigorous enforcement. On the other hand, hard laws are mandatory, legally enforceable measures. Following 
Jonathan Tucker (2012b), one can distinguish between more or less stringent governance measures, ranging 
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from statutory regulations or reporting requirements to security guidelines or pre-publication reviews up to 
codes of conduct, transparency measures or risk education and general awareness raising with regard to the 
dual-use nature of machine learning techniques (Minehata and Sture 2010). Although a bunch of 
international and national governance approaches (Daly et al. 2019) as well as legal norms already exist, 
regulating complexes like privacy, data protection, security, confidentiality, environmental protection, 
armament, labeling and many more, numerous areas of machine learning research and development are 
unregulated and in need of legal enactment (Calo 2017). At the same time, one also has to keep in mind that 
the enactment of laws which are supposed to deal with complex dynamics in technology development, where 
potential harms can only be foreseen through vague technology assessment (Collingridge 1980), bears the 
risk of stifling innovations or smothering promising technologies in an early stage. In the end, governance 
measures must be able to accommodate to new developments and findings. Norms, laws, principles or rules 
should be modified or amended in an iterative manner in order to adapt and keep pace to an ever changing 
and highly accelerated field of research and technological change which constantly creates new risks and 
benefits. 
 measures potential side effects  
hard law legal regulations stifling innovations / restricting scientific 
freedom 
more 
stringent 
 mandatory registration / 
reporting requirements 
some research may drift off into secrecy  
 export controls emergence of black markets  
soft law security guidelines guidelines are not implemented in practice  
 organizational self-
governance 
not all relevant organizations will participate  
 international standards standards are too abstract and not applicable to 
specific situations  
 
 pre-publication risk 
assessment 
scientists downplaying risks in order to promote 
and publish their research 
 
informal codes of conduct treaties having a “figleaf function”, fending off 
criticism 
 
 information sharing abuse of confidence of partner organizations   
 risk education and 
awareness raising 
empowering malicious agents or organizations  
 whistle-blowing channels whistleblowers must endure repressions of all 
kinds 
 
less 
 transparency measures giving inspirations for abuse scenarios stringent 
technical central access licensing 
models 
concentration of power on a few particular 
organizations 
 
Table 3 - Governance of forbidden knowledge, based on the spectrum of governance measures by (Tucker 2012b) 
5.1 Limits on the pursuit of knowledge 
A limitation of the approach described in this paper is that restrictions on publication practices in the field 
of machine learning would not be necessary at all if research directions or strands which can obviously lead 
to harmful outcomes would not be pursued in the first place – an approach which Seumas Miller (2018) 
called “collective scientific ignorance”. This would also mean not to encourage pursuing those research 
directions or strands via call for abstracts or papers in the context of conferences or journals. However, 
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machine learning is in most cases a general purpose or dual-use technology, meaning that it has general 
capabilities, which are applicable to countless varying purposes. Thus, any efforts to restrict foundational 
research in the field are misleading. The only reasonable way of limiting the pursuit of knowledge at all is to 
restrict very specific strands of applied research, for instance, in the field of synthetic media – which is again 
a problematic step since it undermines the scientific freedom. 
Despite that, a popular argument which is used to counter the idea to restrict research strands or scientific 
publication practices is to say that “if we do not do research on X or develop X, someone else will”. This 
argument is used to wipe away all sorts of ethical concerns. However, it fails for several reasons. First, many 
studies show that moral behavior is “contagious”, meaning that the morally desirable as well as the 
unacceptable behavior swiftly finds imitators and spreads (Kraft-Todd et al. 2018; Bollinger and Gillingham 
2012; Eker et al. 2019). Applied to the field of ethics of science, this means that abstaining from pursuing 
certain research questions can be seen as an example and is imitated, while an “if we do not do research on 
X or develop X, others will do it” attitude leads to a general lack of accountability and disregard for ethical 
concerns. Second, the argument fails because of the fact that leap innovations are of course not inevitably 
made. The correct formula would be: “If we do not do X, then others might do it with a certain likelihood.” 
5.2 Pre-publication risk assessment 
Demands for changing the common peer review process in computer sciences with regard to a greater 
caution for “side effects” of machine learning technologies are nothing new (Hecht et al. 2018). The idea is 
that computer scientists shall at least be obliged to add paragraphs about all reasonable broader impacts, 
both positive and negative, to their papers and proposals. In case a research proposal or paper has 
predominantly negative impacts, it should discuss complementary technologies or other interventions that 
could mitigate these impacts – or reviewers should be encouraged to simply reject the proposal or paper. 
Journal editors could be part of this process of a pre-publication risk assessment (see Table 6). Although polls 
show that the majority of researchers disagree that journal editors should reject a paper, if the reviewers 
have concerns about the social acceptability of the research findings (Kempner et al. 2011), this does not 
mean that the idea of journal editors rejecting papers for security concerns is completely declinable. Having 
said this, another option editors have is not to reject certain papers, but to demand a staged or delayed 
publication, so that unintended consequences or misuse scenarios can be scrutinized for the time being. 
Nevertheless, one must consider two limitations of this approach. First, research also takes place in 
companies, where no typical academic publication process is entrenched. Second, current publication 
practices embrace the possibility of releasing papers via preprint servers like arXiv, where no thorough peer-
review takes place. For instance, when mathematicians were asked if they would publish a dangerous 
algorithm, say a solution to break encryption solutions via an algorithm for fast factorization, the typical 
response is: “‘I would publish it on arXiv immediately. It’s my right to publish whatever mathematical work 
I do.’” (Chiodo and Clifton 2019, p. 14) In this view, preprint servers can be an impediment to responsible 
disclosure practices in the sciences. Responsible disclosure means – to stick to the example of IT security – 
to delay the publication of vulnerability descriptions until patches or other precautionary measures are in 
place. But since there might be no “patches” when it comes to the dissemination of certain types of forbidden 
knowledge in machine learning, it is an ethical requirement that researchers refrain from conducting 
research or publishing it in certain areas. 
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Every scientist has interests (Johnson 1999). Especially in the field of machine learning, one can become well 
known or even famous within one’s own community relatively easily, given that there are still numerous 
unexplored areas within research and due to newly available methods – in particular deep neural networks 
(Fan et al. 2019) –, breakthroughs and innovations can be achieved in various fields. If scientists or research 
organizations decide to withhold certain research results from the public or to demonstrate it only to certain 
colleagues or media representatives, this can mean they are using this move as a marketing strategy. Apart 
from that, one has to think about how to compensate absent reputation gains in case of self-chosen or 
externally enforced publication restrictions. Delayed or absent publication means that opportunities for 
reputations gains or subsequent research are lost in order to mitigate or prevent potential risks. At the same 
time, however, the scientific reward system or career advancement, which requires a long publication list 
and pushes scientists to publish their research, can counteract security concerns (Selgelid 2007). 
Furthermore, not releasing research papers at all or not to the full extent has the disadvantage that it is 
harder to replicate and, in this way, approve or refute particular research results. A possible solution to 
mitigate this situation is to establish robust communication channels between machine learning research 
organizations (Solaiman et al. 2019a), following established information sharing principles, for instance, in 
the computer security community. 
publication process 
time  
immediate release via preprint pre-publication risk assessment no publication 
staged publication 
selected distribution 
full publication 
normal publication via peer-review 
Table 4 - Paths of publication 
5.3 Information sharing rules 
In the context of information sharing rules, pre-existing considerations from the field of IT security and its 
practice of exchanging information on cyber threats can be drawn upon (Johnson et al. 2016; Sillaber et al. 
2016). The IT security community already has standardizations for cyber security data sharing like, for 
instance, “Structured Threat Information eXpression” (STIX) or “Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator 
Information” (TAXII) as well as more than twenty threat sharing organizations or platforms like the 
“Malware Information Sharing Platform” (MISP), the “Information Sharing and Analysis Center” (ISAC) or 
the “Information Sharing and Analysis Organization” (ISAO) at their disposal, where companies can share 
risk information in a secure environment (Sauerwein et al. 2017). Such an infrastructure is missing for 
machine learning applications and their potentially harmful societal implications. 
Nevertheless, some preliminary ideas for sensitive information sharing rules in the field of machine learning 
can be drafted. The rules are supposed to set restrictions for sharing and distributing research findings, 
training data, code or final-trained neural network models. Sharing is only supposed to happen when the 
trustworthiness of the recipients can be guaranteed. Furthermore, the goals and objectives, as well as the 
scope of information sharing should be clear. Before sharing takes place, it should be considered whether 
parts of the information have to be anonymized or sanitized. Ultimately, the potential impacts of information 
sharing with particular third parties should be assessed. This can either mean not to share information 
 15 
 
outside of one’s own meeting or just verbally and in person. It can also mean to exchange information only 
inside of one’s own organization and with trustworthy clients. Or it can mean to share sensitive information 
along a predetermined set of trusted partner organizations, which would be the laxest form of a selective 
sharing regime (Johnson et al. 2016, p. 15). 
Moreover, a further idea how to deal with potential harmful machine learning applications in order to restrict 
access to them, while at the same time making them available to authorized persons, is to provide a central 
access licensing model (Brundage et al. 2018, 89 ff.). This means that authorized persons can access 
particular capabilities of a given machine learning application remotely via application programming 
interfaces (APIs), while the application itself, and respectively its code, is stored at a secure location or 
storage, similar to a cloud provider. Advantages of such a model lie in the fact that restrictions like limitations 
to the frequency of the usage of particular capabilities or speed limitations might prevent at least some 
malicious or abusive use cases. Furthermore, the terms of service can legally prohibit particular use cases. 
Central access licensing models cannot thwart the abuse of its services in general, but they can at least lower 
the likelihood of misusage.  
5.4 Making forbidden knowledge public 
Withholding forbidden knowledge or, to be more precise, the existence of certain types of forbidden 
knowledge from the public is not per se appropriate (Bostrom 2017). Apart from research organizations, this 
holds true especially for intelligence agencies, which may be ahead of time with regard to the use of certain 
machine learning technologies and possess ways of acquiring forbidden knowledge without public consent 
or public awareness (Kova 2019). Since a situation like this can contradict democratic norms, it may be 
ethically required to speak openly about forbidden knowledge in intelligence agencies in order to raise public 
awareness and to let democratic representatives, who oversee those agencies, decide whether the used 
methods are legitimate. Scientists, especially those who are working for intelligence or military agencies, 
may feel an obligation to speak truth to power and to warn the public about certain threats emerging from 
machine learning applications. In general, only through public awareness wider societal mitigation measures 
can take place, for instance new anti-discrimination norms (Hagendorff 2019a), resilience against attacks via 
synthetic media (Chesney and Citron 2018) or research on technical counter measures (Li et al. 2018). This 
way of arguing is already established in large parts of synthetic biology, where scientists stress that when 
making forbidden knowledge public, it is important to inform a wider scientific community about new 
threats in order to support understanding of those threats and to serve biodefence preparations (Selgelid 
2007; Atlas et al. 2003). 
5.5 Postdisclosure measures 
Postdisclosure measures are important, because even if a particular research institute decides not to publish 
high-stakes machine learning research results, other institutes may make simultaneous discoveries or 
inventions and choose not to refrain from publication. Furthermore, defectors who do not adhere to non-
disclosure agreements of particular organizations may decide to pursue or publish research results which 
depict forbidden knowledge and gain a competitive edge (Ovadya and Whittlestone 2019). Thus, in many 
cases it is only a matter of time until the availability of methods to acquire forbidden knowledge is on the 
rise. Combined with the prospect of less and less possibilities of information control, meaning that 
mechanisms to govern forbidden knowledge are in many cases highly unreliably, one has to decide: is it 
better to spend one’s resources on restricting the dissemination of forbidden knowledge or should one put 
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effort into preparing the society to deal with high-stakes machine learning applications – or would the best 
option be to restrain from following particular research questions in the first place? While the former and 
the latter option cannot be generalized, since it can always be assumed that individuals or organizations with 
harmful motives exist, efforts to prepare societies for risky applications of machine learning can be 
generalized freely. This does not mean that only one of these approaches should be pursued. Rather, the 
combination of abstaining from specific research, restricting the dissemination of knowledge and educating 
people about risks is promising. 
6 Conclusion 
Discourses about publication restrictions are already entrenched in the field of IT security as well as in 
biotechnology research. This paper makes the case for transferring this discourse to the field of machine 
learning research. No different from the aforementioned strands of research, inventions and scientific 
breakthroughs in machine learning can yield dual-use applications that pose massive threats for individual 
or public security. This paper is a plea to take those risks more seriously. All in all, a bunch of different 
methods have to be combined in order to deal with forbidden knowledge in an appropriate manner. Those 
methods comprise monitoring measures of forbidden knowledge, expert risk evaluation, education in 
responsible research processes, pre-publication risk assessments, responsible information sharing as well 
as disclosure rules, technical restrictions, postdisclosure measures and many more. In sum, the idea of 
forbidden knowledge in machine learning should not put limits or constraints on science or the pursuing of 
legitimate research questions – but limits on the way research insights are shared. These limits should be 
established not because machine learning science itself is dangerous. Rather, it is the current political and 
cultural climate in many parts of the world that brings forth risks of misusing software as a tool to harm or 
suppress other people. 
Having this in mind, a tangible political response not only to the increasing importance of machine learning 
technologies in more and more areas of life and work, but also to the emergence of forbidden knowledge or 
highly sensitive information, would have to establish specific authorities to deal with the responsible 
research, development and application of artificial intelligence. Just as environmental, civil protection or 
nuclear energy authorities are used to safeguard a country’s population, a centralized state artificial 
intelligence agency could, among other things, institutionalize technology monitoring as well as address the 
processes of managing forbidden knowledge as described in the text. An artificial intelligence agency could 
help to keep certain sensitive information classified while, at the same time, educating the public about the 
existence of forbidden knowledge and potential consequences of its spreading. This education should aim at 
the promotion of tolerance and equal rights as well as collective moral responsibility on the part of machine 
learning scientists. As long as such an agency is not put into practice, the task of monitoring and governing 
forbidden knowledge in machine learning must be shared between teams of researchers, the administration 
of research institutions, journal editors or other independent committees, where everyone possesses a 
partial, individual share of the overall collective moral responsibility. 
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